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Abstract
It is sometimes remarked that while the preoccupation with the history of technology is a mature and
well-established discipline, the preoccupation with the philosophy of technology is at best recent, and at
worst considered as marginal in academic terms. In contrast, its relative, the philosophy of science is
eminently respectable and unquestioningly accepted by the philosophical community.
This paper, first, briefly sets out the historical relationship between science and technology in the West.
Against such a context, it then looks at the epistemological values and goals embedded respectively in
the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology, to consider their overlap as well as their
differences. It uses the study of genetics, its two revolutions in the twentieth century – classical
Mendelian genetics and DNA molecular genetics – as an example to demonstrate these points of
similarities and differences, thereby also establishing that the philosophy of technology is indeed a
serious preoccupation.
Introduction
It is sometimes remarked that while the preoccupation with the history of technology is a mature and
well-established discipline, the preoccupation with the philosophy of technology is at best recent, and at
worst considered as marginal in academic terms. In contrast, its relative, the philosophy of science is
eminently respectable and unquestioningly accepted by the philosophical community.
This paper will examine one of the important factors behind the academic imbalance between the
philosophy of science on the one hand and the philosophy of technology on the other. It will argue
that the less fortunate position of the latter may be traced to the history of technology itself, and to
the failure to realise that that history has undergone a by and large ignored sea-change since the
middle of the mid nineteenth century, a change which becomes increasingly more and more obvious
in the light of scientific developments in the twentieth century which has just ended. This paper
will use the study of genetics, its two revolutions in the last century – classical Mendelian genetics
and DNA molecular genetics – as an example to demonstrate the point.
In the light of this development, it would then be possible to look at the epistemological values and
goals embedded respectively in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of technology, to
consider their overlap as well as their differences, and in the process to show that the philosophy of
technology is indeed a serious preoccupation.
History of Modern Science and Modern Technology
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It is generally agreed that modern western science began in the seventeenth century, superseding
medieval science. The latter was embedded within a metaphysics which is referred to as
Aristotelianism. This philosophical worldview is profoundly teleological in character, which is to
say, that its explanation of all natural phenomena incorporates the notions of the formal and final
causes in addition to those of the material and efficient causes. In fact its explanatory paradigm is
that of a human artefact, such as a statue – an object made out of stone (the material cause), carved
my a human being (the efficient cause), with a certain blueprint carried in the head of the sculptor
or drawn on a piece of parchment, let us say, of the figure of Napoleon the Great (the formal cause)
whose aim is to commemorate one of Napoleon’s military triumphs (the final cause). A purely
physical phenomenon like a rock falling to the ground will similarly be explained thus: the rock (the
material cause) is spewed into the air by the erupting volcano (the efficient cause), but it will
ultimately fall to the ground as the natural home of heavy objects such as rocks is the ground.
Furthermore, as it falls, it would fall faster and faster as it reaches its natural home (final cause),
just as a person who is returning home after having been away walks faster and faster as he reaches
nearer and nearer his front door, overwhelmed with joy at the prospect of seeing his loved ones
again.
This metaphysical framework which reigned for nearly two thousand years was replaced by another
when modern western science appeared – Galileo is often credited with the inauguration of the
mechanistic paradigm as well as the concept of the mathematization/quantification of nature, which
together render redundant two of Aristotle’s four causes, namely, formal and final, retaining only
the material and the efficient. As a result, modern science is only concerned with the “what” and
the “how” questions, but not the “why” question. Once the scientist has ascertained the physical
material forces which cause the rock to fall and measured its rate of fall, explanation is complete.
Formal and final causes are from this perspective “metaphysical” in the abusive sense of the term,
that is to say, they are obscurantist, (because imperceptible and unquantifiable) and therefore,
unintelligible. Furthermore, modern scientific methodology demands that the most complete
explanation should take a reductionist turn – the complex whole is to be analysed in terms of the
structure and the functioning of its component parts, such that, for example, the organism is to be
explained in terms of its organs and their respective functions, in turn the organ is to be explained
in terms of its cells, and the cells in terms of its molecules. According to this perspective, the
whole is no more than the sum of its parts.
Of late, this materialistic and mechanistic metaphysics and its accompanying reductionist
methodology have been much criticised. However, in spite of its flaws and limitations, it is
undeniable that they have produced spectacular achievements in the last four centuries and are likely
to continue to do so in the twenty first century, as by and large, they remain a fruitful research
programme, which shows no imminent sign of running out of steam. Hypotheses postulated within
such a framework have led to the numerous fundamental discoveries in science, from classical
astronomy in the seventeenth century, to classical physics in the eighteenth, to chemistry in the
nineteenth, to atomic and quantum physics, not to mention classical as well as molecular
genetics/biology in the twentieth.
If modern science has had, on the whole, an impressive record of success for four centuries in the
various scientific disciplines, can one simply infer from this fact that modern technology too has an
equally long record of achievements? The inference is only too natural, but one would be wrong.
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The history of modern technology and that of modern science does not neatly coincide. Pre-modern
or craft technology prevailed in the western world well after the emergence of modern science, until
the mid nineteenth century when the fundamental theoretical discoveries of modern physics and
chemistry induced technological revolutions in large-scale industrial production and manufacture of
goods. In physics, by 1831, Faraday had discovered electro-magnetism; his work and those of
Volta, Galvani, Oersted, Ampere and others led eventually to the invention of the electric cell, the
storage cell, the dynamo, the electric lamp which were spectacularly translated into industrial terms
by the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the form of the electric power station, the telephone,
the radio telegraph. Augmenting these were the phonograph, the moving picture, the steam turbine,
the airplane. On the chemistry front, it was the isolation of benzine by Faraday in the 1830s (and
later, the use of naphtha) which made the industrial use of rubber possible. Advances in organic
chemistry permitted the industrial utilisation of coal beyond using it as a direct source of energy.
From one ton of coal, one could get 1500 pounds of coke, 111 360 cubic feet of gas, 12 gallons of
tar, 25 pounds of ammonium phosphate and 4 gallons of light oils. From coal tar itself, the chemist
produced new medicines, dyes, resins, perfumes. Metallurgy also took revolutionary steps forward;
however, aluminum, discovered by Oersted as early as 1825, had to await the arrival of electricity,
as the cheap source of energy, before its commercial exploitation became feasible in the last decade
of the century. Rare metals were incorporated into the industrial processes – for example, selenium,
whose electrical resistance varies inversely with the intensity of light, was used in automatic
counting devices and electric door-openers.1
Before these events, far from it being the case that theoretical discoveries led to radical
technological innovations, the causal arrow was not from theoretical science to technology; it was
in the other direction, that is to say, that craft technology even led to basic discoveries in science.
Witness the birth of that fundamental science called thermodynamics. The second industrial
revolution in Britain was built on the invention of the steam engine, first used in pumping water
from deep coal mines, and then later used to drive trains. This key technological innovation gave
Britain a head start in developing its industrial might – an innovation improved upon by the great
George Stephenson, a mechanic who knew neither physics nor chemistry, not to mention the fact
that he did not even know how to read or write. The French man, Sadi Carnot, out of patriotic
fervour, was determined to perfect the efficiency of the steam engine, in order that France might
steal the march upon perfidious Albion. His efforts led him ultimately to formulating the laws of
thermodynamics.
In other words, science-induced technology has only a history of a mere hundred and fifty years
compared to the history of craft technology which covers several millennia, ever since humans
made the first stone tool. From this perspective, it is not a wonder that technology has for so long
occupied an inferior status compared to “pure science” in modern history. However, this excuse is
both unjustified and inexplicable given that since the middle of the nineteenth century, no major or
truly radical technological innovation has taken place independently of fundamental discoveries in
basic science, so much so that such technology has been called “applied science”. Admittedly,
fundamental theoretical discoveries provide only a necessary condition, and not both a necessary
and sufficient condition, for engendering associated technologies. Other factors must, of course, also
obtain for their emergence. Nevertheless, the point is clear that modern technology and modern
science have been intimately linked since the theoretical discoveries of mid nineteenth century
physics and chemistry.
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Breeding Technologies and the Two Revolutions in Genetics
One can say that there have been three agricultural revolutions in the history of humankind. The
first occurred with the beginning of domestication of plants and animals, the second with the
emergence of Mendelian technology from the 1930s, and the third with the establishment of
biotechnology from the 1970s onwards.2 The first rests on craft technology, which is to say that it
uses the method of trial and error. However, although no systemic theoretical scientific
understanding guided or underpinned this process, one should not belittle such a method or to deny
that it has yielded spectacular achievements in its long history. Just think, for example, of the
modern maize and how different it is from its supposed ancestor in the wild, the teosinthe; of the
numerous breeds of dogs, all derived from their wild ancestor, the wolf. However, plant and animal
breeding took a gigantic and radical step forward when the laws of segregation and of independent
recombination of genetic factors, which Gregor Mendel had discovered and first published in 1866,
but which were ignored by the then community of biologists, were re-discovered by other
biologists, nearly forty years later. As a result, officially, the first science of genetics (what may be
called classical or Mendelian genetics) saw the light of day only at the turn of the twentieth century.
And when it did, it did not meet with instant acceptance either, until experimental work proved that
the laws held not only for plants but also for animals, and until Thomas Hunt Morgan had
discovered the chromosome. Although all breeders the world over, but especially those in the USA,
knew what promises would eventually be in store, it, nevertheless, took over thirty years before that
basic science of genetics (the gene/chromosome theory) yielded its first technological fruit in the
form of what is called the technology of double hybridization.3
The twentieth century has been blessed with two revolutions in genetics, not merely one. The
second took place with the discovery of the double-helix structure of the DNA molecule by Francis
Crick and James Watson in 1957. At the same time during the second half of the last century, very
significant advances were made in cell and molecular biology which, together with DNA genetics,
have induced a radically new suite of technologies – biotechnology – for the manipulation of genetic
material, ranging from the cloning of Dolly the sheep in 1997, to the latest which has permitted the
birth of a mouse (Kagayu) with genetic endowments from two female parents in 2004, as well as
the by now very well established procedures of DNA genetic engineering.4 The latter took roughly
fifteen years to emerge following the discovery of the double-helix structure of the DNA molecule,
about half the time it took classical Mendelian genetics to engender the technology of double
hybridization. Between theoretical discoveries or pure science on the one hand and technology or
“applied science” on the other, the gap appears to be getting shorter, at least as far as the domain of
genetics and genetic manipulation is concerned.
Each succeeding revolution has led to the creation of organisms through manipulation at a deeper or
more reductionistic level than their predecessors. For instance, relative to the plants and animals
bred by means of craft technology where whole organisms are selected to mate (in the case of
sexually-producing organisms), plants and animals under Mendelian breeding technology are
selected for certain desirable genetic traits. The procedure of in vitro fertilization may illustrate the
point in question. Under craft technology, a cow with a certain desirable characteristic and a bull
with another must literally meet each other in order to mate, and with luck, would reproduce
offspring which have the desirable characteristics of both parents. Under Mendelian technology, the
cow need not physically encounter the bull. It is sufficient that the semen of the prize bull be
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introduced into not merely one desirable cow, but a whole range of desirable cows. Relative to
mating, such a technology by-passes in a significant manner the requirement that (two) whole
organisms be involved in reproduction. In other words, there may be reproduction without mating
in the traditional sense of that term, as a sample of the genetic material at least of the male can be
isolated, detached from the whole animal, and then inserted into the reproductive organs of not
merely one female animal but as many of them, residing in different parts of the world as desired,
or the available desirable sperms permit. (This is because the science of Mendelian genetics tells us
that the hereditary material of the animal is carried in the sperm of the male or the egg of the female
and that the genotype of an animal may be different from that of another even when they are alike
phenotypically).
However, in the case of biotechnology, the procedure becomes even more reductionist, as it is
manipulating genetic material at the level of DNA sequences – an undesirable sequence could be
excised and a more desirable sequence inserted. In the light of this more radical revolution, one
could say that Mendelian technology merely finesses the traditional procedure of breeding plants
and animals. Both Mendelian and craft technologies of breeding suffer from one severe limitation:
they only permit the transfer of genetic material between members of varieties belonging to the
same species. In contrast, biotechnology permits the transfer of genetic material across species as
well as kingdom barriers. The transgenic organism is par excellence such a product – the transgenic
cow with a DNA sequence belonging to homo sapiens inserted into its genome, or the transgenic
tomato plant which has inserted in its genome a DNA sequence belonging to the flounder fish. Ex
hypothesi, the cow and the human could not mate in nature; neither could the tomato plant mate
with the flounder fish.5
This is to say that the deeper the level at which genetic material is manipulated and transferred –
from whole organism, to part of an organism (namely the egg or the sperm), to specific DNA
sequences which express certain desirable characteristics (belonging to organisms of different
species and even kingdoms) – the greater is the degree of artefacticity possessed by the organisms
thus manipulated. Traditionally- domesticated plants and animals, Mendelian hybrids, transgenic
organisms are all biotic artefacts, but each sort possesses varying degrees of artefacticity in an
ascending order, culminating (for now) in Dolly the sheep, Kaguya the mouse and truly transgenic
organisms such as the transgenic cow or tomato plant mentioned above.
Modern Science and Modern Technology: Their Respective Epistemological Goals
While modern science may be said to have three goals – explanation, prediction and control of
phenomena – modern technology is obviously only identified with the third, namely, control. In
other words, in spite of the claim sometimes made that fundamental theoretical science (or what
some people in the trendy parlance of today call “blue-sky” research) is only concerned with
explanation and prediction, it is not true that basic science has no interest in the ultimate goal of the
human control of nature. As we shall see in a moment, those great thinkers who provide the
philosophical underpinning for modern science have gone out of their way to incorporate such a
goal in their philosophy of science. But first let us say a few brief words about the relationship
between the three goals identified under modern science.
According to the positivist methodology and philosophy of science, the logic of predicting an event,
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/leepaper.html[9/18/2009 5:08:30 PM]
explaining an event, as well as testing a theory or hypothesis is symmetrical; furthermore, it also
upholds the unity of method thesis.6 On this conception, the ability of science to make predictions
is crucial. To predict a phenomenon is to invoke a law (a regularity or uniformity of sequence)
which licenses the prediction; in turn, a law is tested in terms of the prediction it licenses.
Prediction, then, is the lynch pin of an epistemology which decrees that the scope of knowledge is
delimited by the sensory given. A system of thought, which does not issue in testable predictions,
cannot count as knowledge. This entails an exclusion from the scientific domain any theory which
is incapable of issuing in testable (hence precise) predictions; on this view, for instance, geology is
in danger of not qualifying to be a science, as its principles or laws permit explanations, but not
predictions precise enough to be readily testable.
Apart from the crucial role of prediction in epistemological terms, the possibility of prediction is
also linked to the possibility of control. Auguste Comte held this to be so. If one can successfully
make predictions with the help of laws, then one can take steps to get out of the way of the event
predicted, if it is considered to be undesirable (the weak sense of control). Or one could alter or
modify the circumstances, so that certain desired results could be brought about and other undesired
ones prevented from arising (the strong sense). Astronomical knowledge enables one, for instance,
to predict an eclipse of the sun at a certain place and on a certain date. Then one can arrange to be
there to observe it, if its observation can be used to further some other task, like Eddington’s
expedition in 1919 to test Einstein’s theory. Alternatively, if an eclipse of the sun is considered to
have undesirable effects – suppose observing one causes cancer of the eye – then one could take
appropriate avoiding action.
The second possibility allows one to interfere more directly with the workings of nature. According
to the laws established about plant growth, a certain degree of warmth, and not merely exposure to
light, encourages plant growth. If one wishes to encourage growth, then one ought to put the plants
in a warm place.
For Comte, the possibility or the lack of direct intervention depends on the type of phenomenon
studied; astronomical phenomena are too large in scale and too far away for us to influence and to
control, whereas physiological phenomena are not.7 However, the possibility of control in both the
weak and the strong senses provides the link between science and what Comte called ‘art’, or
between science and technology, as we would put it today. In this way, the new science has always
been connected up with utility (for humans) – a theme that Francis Bacon had made familiar.
According to some critics, the weak form of control is not the real goal. It is faute de mieux, and at
best, a prelude to the aspiration of controlling nature in the strong form.8 Being able to predict the
onset of drought or rain is clearly better than not being able to do so at all. But it would be better if
scientific theoretical understanding of meteorological phenomena ultimately enables one either to
generate rain (when drought is undesired) or to hold rain at bay (when dry weather is desired).
To Comte’s and Bacon’s voice on this matter, Descartes also added his:
... as soon as I had acquired some general notions in physics and had noticed, as I began
to test them in various particular problems, where they could lead and how much they
differ from the principles used up to now, I believed that I could not keep them secret
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without sinning gravely against the law which obliges us to do all in our power to secure
the general welfare of mankind. For they opened my eyes to the possibility of gaining
knowledge which would be very useful in life, and of discovering a practical philosophy
which might replace the speculative philosophy taught in the schools. Through this
philosophy we could know the power and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, the
heavens and all the other bodies in our environment, as distinctly as we know the various
crafts of our artisans; and we could use this knowledge as the artisans use theirs for all
the purposes for which it is appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, the lords
and masters of nature. This is desirable not only for the invention of innumerable
devices which would facilitate our enjoyment of the fruits of the earth and all the goods
we find there, but also, and most importantly, for the maintenance of health, which is
undoubtedly the chief good and the foundation of all the other goods in this life. ... we
might free ourselves from innumerable diseases, both of the body and of the mind, and
perhaps even from the infirmity of old age, if we had sufficient knowledge of their
causes and of all the remedies that nature has provided. (1992, pp. 142-3.)
The biotechnology which is about to emerge from the Human Genome Project can be said to be the
fulfilment not merely of the personal dream of Descartes enunciated about four centuries ago but of
the dream of modern western science itself embodied in that Cartesian vision. The philosophical as
well as the ideological requirements of the new world-view ensure that science-as-technology, and
science-as-theoretical knowledge, ultimately go hand in hand. While humans had used and
controlled nature in the past, modern science (at least from the 1840s onwards) makes it possible
for them, more systematically than ever before, to control (to exploit) nature at a deeper and deeper
level of manipulation.
However, in spite of the close philosophical link between modern science and modern technology
via the goal of the control of nature, it remains true that there are very significant differences in
their epistemological orientations which should not be overlooked. We need to spell these out. The
epistemic goals of theory formulation and testing (as well as explaining and predicting phenomena)
are perceived to be somewhat different and distinct from those of testing hypotheses in the
technological domain. The recognition that their epistemic goals are distinct is reflected by the fact
that, while the philosophy of science has a recognised and well-established agenda, an analogous
philosophy of technology does not obviously exist. Indeed, while the former is an eminently
respectable part of philosophical enquiry, the latter may be held at arms length with a degree of
suspicion, even if it does not draw a blank. The agenda of the one may be clear, that of the other is
not. Bunge feels the need to sketch an outline for that missing agenda. He writes:
Some of the typical problems in the philosophy of technology are these: (a) Which
characteristics does technological knowledge share with scientific knowledge, and which
are exclusive of the former? (b) In what does the ontology of artifacts differ from that of
natural objects? (c) What distinguishes a technological forecast from a scientific
forecast? (d) How are rule of thumb, technological rule, and scientific law related? (e)
Which philosophical principles play a heuristic, and which a blocking, role in
technological research? (f) Does pragmatism account for the theoretical richness of
technology? (g) What are the value systems and the ethical norms of technology? (h)
What are the conceptual relations between technology and the other branches of
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contemporary culture? (1979, p. 263.)
This paper is concerned only with problem (d) as identified above. First, it may be helpful to point
out the similarities between technological rules and scientific laws since 1840 in two essential
aspects as Bunge (1979, pp. 265-8) has done:
(a) Methodologically, a technological research programme is no different from that of a scientific
one. They include the following elements: identifying and articulating the problem, solving it with
extant empirical or theoretical knowledge, and failing that, putting forward new hypotheses and
ways to try to solve it, working out a solution within the new framework, testing the solution by
experimentation and in the light of that, amending the hypothesis under test or even reformulating
the original problem. (b) Epistemologically and ontologically, technology and pure science share
certain common assumptions: that an external world exists, that we can come to know it partially,
though never totally, and that knowledge of such a world can be improved upon and increased,
though again recognising that the goal of complete and total knowledge can never be reached.9 In
other words, they both subscribe to what may be called critical realism; technologists would realise,
just as the pure scientists, that their theories cannot, literally, be pictures of reality but are symbolic
over-simplified representations of a fairly abstract kind of ‘the reality’ that they are grappling with.
However, in spite of these similarities, it is said that the over-arching epistemological goal of
technology differs from that of science. The critical realism of the technologist is subordinated to
the crucial requirement that the solution works – in other words pragmatism is an over-riding
demand. Unlike pure scientists who often claim that in principle they are interested in knowledge
for the sake of knowledge, technologists are primarily interested in scientific knowledge (if it exists)
as a mere means to the end of providing a solution to the practical problem in hand. If scientific
knowledge is non-existent or unhelpful, they will look elsewhere for assistance. Nor would they be
unduly worried should the viable solution turn out for the moment to lack a proper complete
scientific explanation.
To put it even more strongly, scientific knowledge per se seems neither to be a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for what counts as a successful technological solution to a problem. An example
that it is not the former is the success shown by the traditional methods of artificial selection in
breeding plants and animals. Until the rediscovery of Mendelism in 1900, there was no adequate or
proper explanation to account for their success. An example that illustrates the latter is plate
tectonic theory in geology and seismography which have not so far, at least, led to a technology of
forming new mountains, or of controlling the movements of the earth’s crust or, indeed, even of
accurate predictions of earthquakes.
Technology’s goal of getting practical results also affects its relationship with the concept of truth.
To quote Bunge on this point:
Although in practice (the technologist) adopts the correspondence conception of truth as
adequacy of the intellect or mind to the thing, he will care for the true data, hypotheses
and theories only as long as they are conducive to the desired outcomes. He will often
prefer a simple half-truth to a complex truth. He must, because he is always in a hurry to
get results. Besides, any error made in neglecting some factor (or some decimal figure) is
likely to be overshadowed by unpredictable disturbances his real system may undergo.
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Unlike the physicist, the chemist, or the biologist, he cannot protect his systems against
shocks other than by building shock-absorbing mechanisms into them. For similar
reasons, the technologist cannot prefer deep but involved theories when superficial ones
will do. However, unless he is a pseudotechnologist, he will not shy away from complex
and deep theories if they promise success. ... The technologist, in sum, will adopt a
mixture of critical realism and pragmatism, varying these ingredients according to his
needs. He will seem to confirm first one and then another epistemology, while actually
all he intends to do is to maximize his own efficiency regardless of philosophical
loyalties. (1979, p. 269)
The epistemological target of (pure) scientific theorising is truth, or at least, approximation to truth,
according to one conspicuous tradition in the philosophy of science, such as Popper’s. However,
when technology applies the findings of pure science – for instance, when a theory of flight is based
on the theory of fluid dynamics – the epistemological target of such technological theories is
efficiency, not truth (or verisimilitude). Indeed it may be said to adhere to the following
methodological rule: only adopt as deep a scientific theory as is adequate for the problem in hand.
In this sense, it is theoretically less sophisticated than pure science, although it makes up for this
theoretical naivety by being wholly opportunistic in using knowledge of any kind, from any domain
(whether ordinary, older, less sophisticated or the latest sophisticated deep theory in science). For
example, in constructing an optical instrument, the technologists would rely, in the main, on ray
optics, a theory of optics based on what was known about light round about the middle of the
seventeenth century. They would ignore wave optics except to the extent of helping them to
understand why certain effects occur, such as the appearance of colours near the edge of the lens
which, to them, are considered to be undesirable.
Deeper, more complex and more accurate theories may not necessarily be the most economical to
use – imagine using quantum theory to predict or explain car crashes. Efficiency demands that you
use less deep theories with less operational costs, to get as much out of them with as little input as
possible. From the standpoint of technology, a true scientific theory in principle can be successfully
employed but in practice, technologists may have to decline its help, so long as an alternative exists
which can do the job satisfactorily, but at less cost operationally and, therefore, usually,
economically. The alternative may indeed even be a false theory on the whole, but so long as it
possesses an element of truth, which can be relied on by the technology in question, it would do
fine.
To emphasise the distinction between scientific and technological knowledge, Bunge says that while
the former attempts to formulate laws (about universal regularities), the latter aims at establishing
rules.10 Laws are descriptive – when conditions x, y, z obtain, A obtains. Rules, on the other hand,
are prescriptive. They are what may be called hypothetical imperatives – if one wishes to achieve A,
then one ought to do x. Craft technology primarily relied on pre-scientifc rules (rules of thumb used
for millenia in procedures of food production such as yeast fermentation in brewing and baking).
By mid-nineteenth century, technological rules are grounded in scientific laws. By this is meant
that the laws must be capable of accounting for, or explaining, the efficacy of the rules. To prevent
water from freezing in the car radiator in the winter, one ought to add anti-freeze to it. The rule
achieving the desired end is successfully and satisfactorily explained in terms of the differential
freezing points of water and methanol or ethandiol (two commonly used anti-freeze substances),
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which in turn could be accounted for by further deeper theories such as the kinetic and atomic
theories.
Pre-1840 technological rules, on the whole, may be empirically very effective. But because they are
not properly grounded in scientific laws, there is always the possibility that their efficacious
outcome may be a mere coincidence. Suppose (in temperate climates) one adheres to the rule – do
not plant in the depth of winter but in the springtime – one would indeed get a high degree of
horticultural success. But one might mistakenly conclude from this that the plants grow so well
because of the warmth that comes with the spring. But one would be wrong, though not totally
wrong. The warmth is an important component of success, but only when it is accompanied by an
increase of light in the spring and summer, which is vital to plant growth. Today the rule’s efficacy
is properly grounded in our theoretical understanding of the processes involved in photosynthesis
and the conditions under which plant growth obtains.
The above would account for why craft technological rules, though empirically effective, provide
one with less than optimal control over nature. Maybe most of the time they work, but there will be
cases of failure. Within the framework of technological rules, the failure cannot be explained, just
observed. However, it could later be explained in terms of scientific laws when these are
discovered. If so, then the laws in turn could lead to the formulation of improved, more efficacious
rules (that is science-based ones), whose scope of operation may transcend that of the original rule.
Using the plant growth example again, the theoretical understanding of plant physiology, chemistry,
etc., enables the technologist to devise the greenhouse. Such a technological innovation makes it
possible for us humans to overcome the constraints imposed by nature through the rhythm of its
seasons. Now tomatoes in northerly climes will grow the whole year round under artificially
produced conditions of appropriate degrees of warmth and light. Undoubtedly in this way, the scope
has enormously increased one’s control over nature.
It would be helpful to sum up the discussion so far as follows:
1. Craft technology is, by and large, autonomous of science. It flourished in cultures, which lacked
explicit systematic scientific theorising of any kind. It could flourish just as readily in cultures
engaged in such theoretical activities, but underpinned by a metaphysics and using a methodology,
which differ from the modern scientific one. Such technology can be empirically efficacious and,
indeed, was so historically.
2. However, science-based technology is a much more powerful tool in manipulating nature than its
earlier counterpart. Take the treatment of haemophilia in the history of medicine. Initially, the only
alleviation available would have been prevention at the most elementary level, that is, for the
sufferer of the condition to take steps to reduce the chances of being bruised, cut or wounded. Then
under the early phase of science-based technology, haemophiliacs were given whole blood
transfusion. Further medical understanding advanced, and the precise nature of the condition
became understood. It is now known that there are two different forms of haemophilia: haemophilia
A, in which the sufferer lacks a clotting chemical called factor VIII, and haemophilia B, in which
the sufferer lacks factor IX. Of the two, the former is more common than the latter. In the light of
this understanding, a new technology replaced whole blood transfusion. The missing clotting
chemical is injected three times a week to counter the inherited condition. The technology is more
specifically targeted than the one it replaces; as a result, it is scientifically more precise. Its
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emergence is predicated upon advances both in theoretical knowledge and technology, allowing the
clotting chemical to be either extracted from human blood plasma, or manufactured by genetically
engineered organisms.11
But today with the science of molecular genetics and its accompanying technology of genetic
engineering in place, there is room to take the treatment of haemophilia to yet another stage of
development. This is so-called gene therapy. Indeed, it has been reported that this further stage has
already been taken. According to the publication, Science in China (1993), a team of scientists at
the Institute of Genetics in Shanghai had performed it on two teenage haemophiliacs, both suffering
from a lack of factor IX. In the case of one of them, as a result of the treatment, his blood is
reported to be now producing the clotting chemical. If this were really so, it would be a permanent
cure. Using standard gene therapy technique, the team first isolated the gene for factor IX, then
inserted it into a virus. It also removed fibroblasts (cells which form connective tissue under the
skin) from the two patients. The treated virus was used to infect these fibroblasts. The infected
fibroblasts, now carrying the missing gene, were then injected back into the two patients. An
inherited disability is now cured by gene replacement therapy. This admittedly is not as radical as
germ-line gene therapy which, if carried out, could in principle eradicate haemophilia by ensuring
that no sons would be born with the genetic disorder (not merely that males born with such an
inherited condition would be permanently cured of it) or that no mother who is a haemophilia
carrier would give birth to daughters who, in turn, will be carriers.12
3. Although it is the case that more precise scientific theories are not necessarily always relied upon
by technology, which seems to prefer the less precise and complex but still adequate alternative,
such theories are, nevertheless, required to ground the efficacy of the rules, giving them the
maximum epistemological support possible. Going back to the example of ray and wave optics in
the construction of optical instruments, one can see why the former accounts for the instrument’s
overall success, and the latter, for its being less than totally perfect. As we have seen, while
efficacious technological rules may lead to new theoretical understanding, their efficacy, on its own,
is not synonymous with truth.
4. Science-based technology, although induced and led by pure scientific findings, is not entailed by
them. In other words, theoretical advances and revolutions may be a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for its emergence. However, to prevent misunderstanding about this claim, one has to
distinguish between two contexts here: (a) pure theory providing the epistemological grounding and
direction for the induced technology, and (b) a pure theory being actually used in a particular piece
or type of technology. As we have seen, in context b, there are two possibilities: (i) there could be
an alternative, less accurate theory the technology could rely on, or (ii) social, economic and
political considerations may be hostile to the emergence of a new technology. The discussion here
is only confined to (i). As for context a, when a theory-induced technology does emerge, the
efficacy of its technological rules is grounded in, and accounted for, by the laws of the pure theory
– in this sense, there is a very strong empirical, as well as epistemological link, between
technological efficacy and scientific truth. Furthermore, they have certain concepts in common.
‘Deep’ Theories and Their Power of Control via the Technologies They Induce
One needs to say something very briefly here about the distinction between what has been called a
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deeper, as opposed to, a less deep theory in the natural sciences which underpins science-induced
technology. ‘Deep’ may be understood in at least three ways:
1. A less deep theory is ultimately to be explained in terms of a deeper one. The kinetic theory is
explained in terms of the atomic theory, and the latter itself is accounted for by sub-atomic quantum
theory. Relatively speaking, the first is less deep than the second, and the second than the third.
Similarly, Mendelian genetics is accounted for in terms of molecular genetics.
2. The deeper theory may also then be said to be more comprehensive in scope, explaining a wider
range of data, accounting for more variables in their causal contribution to a particular phenomenon.
3. A less deep theory may contain laws about particles and their behaviour at the macro level of
existence and observation, while a deeper theory postulates laws about particles and their behaviour
at the micro level of existence and observation. Newtonian macro physics may then be said to be
less deep than quantum physics.
All three senses are relevant to the discussion in hand. The Modern Project of Science and
Technology is built on the ontology of materialism. Ever since its inception, its central aim has
been to penetrate the nature and structure of matter. Macro properties of the natural world such as
secondary qualities are said not to reside in the object and, therefore, are not real. Objects are
constituted by their primary qualities, which are real. Furthermore, matter at the macro level of
existence is to be broken down analytically into its component parts at the micro level of existence.
Hence the atomic theory of matter – all macro objects are made up of atoms, and molecules which
are themselves combinations of atoms. Twentieth century science has gone even beyond that to the
sub-atomic theory of matter. On this world-view, matter then is ultimately uniform and
homogeneous. Their diversities, in the form of different sorts of organisms, of minerals, that is, of
different natural kinds, are no more than a difference in the arrangement of the primary qualities
involved, of atomic particles which, in turn, are constituted of sub-atomic particles and their nuclei.
As already observed, it has been the visionary ideological goal of modern science from its very
beginning in the seventeenth century to use its theoretical advances to engender powerful
technologies to control and manipulate nature in order to serve human ends. As its theoretical
advances get deeper and deeper into the structure of matter, the theory-induced technologies get
more and more powerful.
Take biology as a discipline. In the words of one well-known historian of the subject:
Contemporary biology is characterized by several important factors. One is the firm
belief that all biological problems can ultimately be studied on the molecular level. This
view does not maintain that studies at other levels of organization, such as that of the
cell, the organ, the whole organism, or the population are of no value. In fact, there is a
growing awareness among some biologists that it is equally as important to study these
higher levels of organization as it is to study the lower, molecular levels. The view that
reduction of a complex biological phenomenon to its simpler components (cells or
molecules) is a sufficient explanation has become less prevalent among biologists in the
early 1970s. Nevertheless, the revolution in molecular biology in 1950s and early 1960s
emphasized the importance of understanding the molecular basis of biological
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/leepaper.html[9/18/2009 5:08:30 PM]
phenomena before trying to approach the larger, higher-level interactions. (Allen, 1979,
pp. xiii-iv)
Biologists, on the whole, since the late 1970s, may, indeed, have resisted strident reductionism of
the kind which says that cells are mere collections of molecules, or ‘what is true of E. coli [a
bacterium] is true of the elephant’, a view prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, the
consensus remains that molecular biology provides a deeper level of theoretical understanding than
classical Mendelian genetics, leading to much more powerful technologies culminating in the
creation of human-made life.
These points may be displayed as follows using haemophilia again as an example:
1. The craft technological rule, yielding only weak control, may be formulated thus: if unstoppable
bleeding is to be avoided, the sufferer of haemophilia ought to avoid being bruised or cut. Call this
TRI. The scope of TRI’s efficacy is not great, in the sense that it is useless, should the sufferer,
unavoidably, be injured. There are, unfortunately, many such situations arising in the lifetime of a
sufferer. Its efficacy is no more impressive than its analogue in a hurricane context where one
could, at best, only advise people to get out of the way of the hurricane, when the signs of its
imminence are detected, there being no means of deflecting it or defusing its strength. This minimal
degree of control is a reflection of the lack of theoretical understanding of the phenomenon in
question (although, as noted earlier, from the epistemological point of view, theoretical
understanding is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the emergence of a more powerful
technology).
2(a). The first science-led technological rule may be formulated thus: to prevent unstoppable
bleeding, the sufferer ought to be given blood transfusion containing normal blood of the right type.
Call this TRIIa. Undoubtedly, the scope of TRIIa’s efficacy is greater than that of TRI, for it can
cope, when the sufferer unavoidably has bruised or wounded himself. But it is beside the point
when the appropriate type of normal blood is not available for transfusion.13 The increase in control
reflects the theoretical understanding that the condition is caused by an inability of the sufferer’s
blood to clot, owing to its lack of a certain chemical, and that it is a genetic disability, not a
functional one.
2(b) The second science-led technological rule may be formulated as follows: to prevent
unstoppable bleeding, the sufferer ought to be given the clotting chemical (factor VIII or IX). Call
this TRIIb. The scope of TRIIb’s efficacy is greater than that of TRIIa, as it overcomes the scarcity
in the supply of normal whole blood, especially when the clotting agent in question can be
produced via genetically engineered organisms. Also, the clotting agent can be more conveniently
introduced into the sufferer’s body through injections, rather than the more cumbersome technology
of full blood transfusion itself. This greater degree of control is a reflection of the more detailed
theoretical understanding about the nature of blood in general, and the specific deficiency isolated
in the blood of haemophiliacs.
2(c) The third science-led technological rule may be formulated as follows: to prevent unstoppable
bleeding, the sufferer ought to be given gene replacement therapy. Call this TRIIc. The scope of
TrIIc’s efficacy is greater than that of TRIIb, as it renders repeated and tiresome injections of the
clotting agent throughout the lifetime of the sufferer redundant. And even more tellingly, the
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sufferer, formerly identified as a haemophiliac, is transformed under such treatment into a non-
haemophiliac. His status has spectacularly altered. His genetic disability has been removed once
and for all (if the treatment is truly successful). This still greater degree of control reflects yet more
advanced theoretical understanding of the nature of heredity via molecular genetics.
2(d) The fourth science-induced technological rule may be formulated as follows: to prevent
unstoppable bleeding in individual males from ever occurring, germ-line therapy ought to be given
to the female carriers of the condition. This would yield male genotypes with the gene to produce
factor VIII or IX. Call this TRIId. The scope of TRIId’s efficacy is in turn greater than that of
TRIIc, for it actually tackles the problem, at an earlier stage, by ensuring that no males would be
born haemophiliac in the first place. This ultimate degree of control is a further reflection of
knowledge in molecular genetics and of the nature of haemophilia as a genetic disability.
One caveat should be entered. The co-relations between the efficacy of technological rules, their
corresponding degree of control on the one hand, and theoretical advances in the relevant pure
sciences on the other, as set out above, are not meant to reflect accurately actual historical co-
relations. They are meant to bring out more clearly the epistemological linkage between
technological rules and scientific laws, namely, that laws ground the efficacy of rules. And in so
doing, one is also laying bare the philosophical foundations for the ideological goal of modern
science to control nature in the strongest form possible, to make it serve human ends, be it the
alleviation of pain, the promotion of material-well being or of freedom and self-realisation.
Conclusion
The discussion above demonstrates the complex links and goals – epistemological, methodological
as well as ideological – between modern theoretical science on the one hand and modern technology
on the hand. Their differences and their similarities first emerged in the mid-nineteenth century
when yet another stage of the Industrial Revolution in the West took off, using technologies
induced by the fundamental discoveries in physics and chemistry. In the twentieth century, biology
saw two revolutions in genetics; and now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
biotechnology, through the theoretical understanding given by molecular biology and molecular
genetics, looks set to drive the Industrial Revolution onwards to yet another deeper level of
development.
Keekok Lee
University of Lancaster
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Notes
1. Mumford, (1946, pp. 217-8)
2. The term “biotechnology” has been used much more widely than what is proposed here. It has
been used even to refer to the techniques and processes of fermentation based on yeast ever since
humans first made wine in the dim recesses of history. This paper proposes to use the term in a
restrictive sense, to refer only to those sets of techniques and procedures generated by the basic
theoretical insights yielded by advances in molecular biology and molecular/DNA genetics since the
1970s.
3. See Kloppenburg, 1990, p. 77.
4. See Sylvia Pagan Westphal, The New Scientist (2004, pp 8-9). This new phenomenon is so
radical that there is no known word which could readily be adapted to describe it.
“Parthenogenesis” has been proposed but the term is misleading as it refers to a phenomenon which
involves the genetic material of only one female. The term “homoparental/homoparentality” has
been proposed.
Dolly the sheep and Kagayu the mouse respectively challenge and successfully overthrow two
dogmatic assumptions in biology – the former, the axiom that no single adult cell could give rise to
an individual organism, and the latter, that no successful reproduction of mammals could occur in
the absence of contribution from sperm(s).
5. The term “transgenic” is used here in a restrictive sense, to refer only to an organism into whose
genome has been inserted a DNA sequence belonging to another species. However, the term is also
used more widely, to refer to any organism into whose genome has been inserted a DNA sequence
from another organism, whether belonging to the same or different species; sometimes all such
organisms are called genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
6. This thesis says that the hypothetico-deductive method can be applied across the board to cover
both the natural and the social sciences. Thomas Hobbes and, later, Auguste Comte were fervent
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advocates.
However, there is another thesis which together with that of the unity of method constitutes the
positivist methodology (of Hobbes and Comte) – it is called the unity of science thesis. However,
unlike the unity of method thesis, not all who care(d) to call themselves positivists would subscribe
to it. It says that all phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of the laws which obtain in the
so-called basic or fundamental science(s), whether physics or chemistry, or physics-cum-chemistry.
Philosophers, like Hobbes in the seventeenth century, and Neurath in the twentieth century, upheld
it. But whether philosophers do or do not, and irrespective of the fashionable distancing of
philosophers from positivism today, it remains true that the reductionism implicated in the unity of
science thesis provides the metaphysical impulse behind scientific explanations even today, as we
have seen in the brief account of Mendelian genetics as well as molecular genetics and biology
given earlier. The reductionistic nature of the technologies spawned by these basic sciences in
transforming living organisms as naturally-occurring beings to become biotic artefacts may, indeed,
be traced back to the thrust of positivist philosophy and its methodology of science.
7. Comte could not possibly have anticipated projects of our times such as terraformation.
8. If so, then only the possibility of control in the strong sense remains as a true goal of science.
9. Scientists, if pressed, are by and large critical realists, although a few may even be naive realists.
On the other hand, many philosophies of science reject realism, even of the critical variety.
10. For a full philosophical discussion, see Bunge, 1983, pp. 69-71.
11. Ian Wilmut and his team, which stunned the world in 1998 with Dolly the cloned sheep, are
also responsible for Polly. Polly is a clone, too, but she is also a genetically transformed clone,
through the technology of nuclear transfer, the technology used also in the creation of Dolly.
According to the Wilmut team, their real achievement in creating Polly is to get her to secrete in
her milk the human protein factor IX – see Wilmut, Campbell and Tudge, 2000.
12. This last step has now been taken. Doctors from the Universitat Autonomia de Barcelona and
researchers from the Cefer Institute of Reproduction in Spain have recently published in the journal,
Prenatal Diagnosis, about the case of a Spanish woman who is a haemophilia carrier, but who has
chosen not to have daughters. The medical team involved made sure that the embryos implanted in
the woman’s uterus were male. The technique used is pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, using in
vitro fertilisation to grow embryos outside the uterus, then testing to check that they do not carry
the gene for the disease, and implanting only such embryos – see Meek, 2000, p. 6.
13. Furthermore, patients who undergo frequent blood transfusions tend to accumulate an excessive
amount of iron, which causes damage to the heart and liver, as well as often interfering with normal
growth and development.
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